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Abstract
In the global insurance market, the number of product-specific policies from different
companies has increased significantly, and strong market competition has boosted the de-
mand for a competitive premium. Thus, in the present paper, by considering the com-
petition between each pair of insurers, an N-player game is formulated to investigate the
optimal pricing strategy by calculating the Nash equilibrium in an insurance market. Under
that framework, each insurer is assumed to maximise its utility of wealth over the unit time
interval. With the purpose of solving a game of N-players, the best-response potential game
with non-linear aggregation is implemented. The existence of a Nash equilibrium is proved
by finding a potential function of all insurers’ payoff functions. A 12-player insurance game
illustrates the theoretical findings under the framework in which the best-response selection
premium strategies always provide the global maximum value of the corresponding payoff
function.
Keywords: Insurance Market Competition; Non-life Insurance; Potential Game with Aggrega-
tion; Pure Nash Equilibrium
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the insurance world, determining an appropriate and attractive premium is always a highly
challenging issue because of the competition among different companies. The premium loading
depends critically on the price that the other insurers charge for comparable policies. Clapp
(1985) was able to demonstrate it using the seminal model by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976,
1992). Insurance pricing is a fundamental aspect that attracts the interest of both actuaries
and academics. Standard actuarial approaches for non-life insurance products suggest that the
premium is divided into three main components: the actuarial price, the safety loading, and the
loading for expenses. The actuarial price is normally deduced according to different premium
principles, such as the Net Premium Principle, the Expected Value Premium Principle, and
others (Rolski et al., 2009; Teugels and Sundt, 2004). Classical approaches focus on determining
the safety loading of each policy class proportional to the expected claim expenses or to its
moment.
However, in a highly competitive insurance environment which is dominated by a relatively
small number of companies (compared with the banking sector and investment funds), each
insurer monitors, attempts to predict reactions, and takes advantages against the others. Thus,
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the actuarial premium might eventually be altered by the marketing and management depart-
ment for several reasons, such as the customer’s affordability, the market conditions, and the
mutualisation across the portfolio of customers to decrease risk. What is more, the pricing
cycles, which are found in different lines of insurance, appear also to be affected by market
competition (Rantala, 1988; Malinovskii, 2010; Emms, 2012). These suggestions indicate that
the insurance premium price should not focus only on the risk assessment. Consequently, to
study the competition among insurers, a model needs to be formulated in order to investigate
insurers’ premium pricing interactions in the corresponding market.
1.2 Developments in Competitive Insurance Markets
Over the last three decades academics have been interested in how competition might affect
insurance premiums and how insurers respond to changes in the premium levels that being
offered by competitors.
Taylor (1986) was the first from the actuarial community who mentioned that competition
is a key component in insurance premium pricing, and he used the Australian market to extract
very useful remarks. The premium was priced based on unit of exposure, which is applicable in
different lines of non-life insurance. Analytically, the relation between the market’s behaviour
and optimal response of an individual insurer was explored, with the objective of maximising
the expected present value of wealth arising from a pre-defined finite time horizon. The law
of demand was embedded in the modelling process to analyse the change of exposure volume
through a comparison between insurer’s and market average premiums. Moreover, he stated
that the optimal response depends on various factors, including: a) the predicted time that
will elapse before a return of market rates to profitability; b) the price elasticity of demand for
the insurance product under consideration; and c) the rate of return required on the capital
supporting the insurance operation. With his next paper, Taylor (1987) noted that the optimum
underwriting strategies might be substantially affected by proper marginal expense rates, a
concept that must be taken also into consideration.
After almost two decades of silence, Emms and his co-authors were able to extend signifi-
cantly Taylor (1986, 1987)’s ideas developing a series of models in continuous time by imple-
menting optimal control theory techniques (Emms and Haberman, 2005; Emms, 2007a; Emms
et al., 2007; Emms, 2007b; Emms and Haberman, 2009; Emms, 2011). In more detail, Emms
and Haberman (2005) assumed that the average premium is a positive random process with
finite mean at time t, and left unspecified the distribution of the mean claim size process; while
Emms et al. (2007) modelled the market’s average premium as a geometric Brownian motion
instead. Simultaneously, Emms (2007a) determined the optimal strategy for an insurer that
maximises a particular objective over a fixed planning horizon and the premium by using a
competitive demand model and the expected main claim size. Moreover, Emms (2007b) con-
sidered the process with different types of constrains. By assuming a deterministic control
framework, the optimisation problem was solved using elements from control parametrisation.
Market reactions regarding one insurer’s premium were considered in (Emms, 2011).
In all previous approaches, fixed premium strategies were considered and sensitivity analysis
of the parameters’ involved in the model was applied. What is more, the ratio of initial market
average premium to breakeven premium, the measure of the inverse elasticity of the demand
function, and the non-dimensional drift of the market average premium were the most influential
parameters in the optimal strategies derived.
Following previous work, Pantelous and Passalidou (2013) proposed a stochastic demand
function for the volume of business in a discrete-time framework. Later on, in (Pantelous
and Passalidou, 2015), the volume of business was formed as a general stochastic demand
function, and making the model more pragmatic and realistic. Moreover, in (Pantelous and
Passalidou, 2016), the volume of business was modelled as a non-linear function with respect to
the accumulated reserves, the premium and the noise. What is more, a quadratic performance
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criterion concerning the utility function was implemented.
1.3 Game-Theoretic Approaches
However, for most of the models and approaches discussed in the previous subsection, a common
assumption was made that there exists a single insurer, whose pricing strategy does not cause
any reaction to the rest of the market’s competitors. Thus, for each participant in the insurance
market, others reaction cannot be observed, and the premium remains eventually unaffected by
their actions. In reality, this situation is not often the case.
Lately, game theoretical approaches have been introduced mostly in the premium pricing
processes of non-life insurance products. Competition among insurers reveals the pricing strat-
egy of each market participant in a constructed insurance game, whereas one can only obtain a
single insurer’s pricing strategy through optimal control used in previous studies. However, in
our approach, as it is discussed more extensively in the following subsection, a non-cooperative
game model is designed for the insurance market implementing already well-defined parame-
ters from the corresponding literature (Taylor, 1986, 1987; Emms et al., 2007; Pantelous and
Passalidou, 2015).
The use of game theory in actuarial science has a long history. The first attempts go back to
Borch (1962, 1974), Bu¨hlmann (1980, 1984), and Lemaire (1984, 1991), who applied cooperative
games to model insurer and reinsurer risk transfer; see also other extensions and reviews (Aase,
1993; Brockett and Xia, 1995; Tsanakas and Christofides, 2006; Boonen, 2015). Two models
were applied in non-life insurance markets for non-cooperative games: a) the Bertrand oligopoly
in which insurers set premiums and b) the Cournot oligopoly in which insurers choose the volume
of business. See (Polborn, 1998; Rees et al., 1999; Dutang et al., 2013) for the Bertrand model
and (Powers et al., 1998; Powers and Shubik, 1998) for the Cournot model.
Emms (2012) developed a model by applying a differential game-theoretic methodology for
a non-cooperative market. Under his framework, each insurer’s price depends on other insurers’
premium strategies, assuming that each market participant chooses an optimal pricing strategy.
Nevertheless, each insurer was assumed to maximize its utility of wealth at the terminal time
of planning horizon. Finally, very recently, Boonen (2016) also proposed a way to optimally
regulate bargaining for risk redistributions. Thus, he investigated the strategic interaction
between two insurance companies that trade risk over-the-counter in a one-period model.
1.4 A New Approach: Potential Game with Aggregation
In our approach, a two-stage non-life insurance game is constructed in a competitive market.
Numerical solutions of Nash equilibria are obtained for a large number of insurers under the two-
stage framework. Moreover, instead of simply parametrizing competition through comparison
between single insurer’s premium and the market average premium as it has been done so far in
the relevant literature (see Subsections 1.2 and 1.3), an aggregate game approach is formulated
to investigate further the insurance market competition. Different from Emms (2012), the
existence of Nash equilibrium is proved under our framework.
The concept of aggregative game, which was first proposed by Selten (1970) by considering
it as the sum of the players’ strategies, is applied broadly in our approach. Thus, the derived
strategy for all insurers in the insurance market is presented as a single parameter, i.e., the
aggregate. In greater detail, each insurer’s utility (payoff) function only depends on its own
pricing premium strategy and the aggregate parameter.
Also following the suggestions by Taylor (2008) and Emms (2012), market competition is
measured by calculating an insurer’s new volume of exposure and by summing up all of the policy
flows during the competition between the insurers and the volume of exposure in a previous
stage. A non-linear aggregate is obtained, which presents the strategies of all insurers in the
market. Moreover, a potential game approach is further developed to prove the existence of a
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Nash equilibrium in the insurance game. This approach also gives us an opportunity to simplify
the problem of determining the Nash equilibrium by solving a single optimisation problem.1
The literature on potential games can be traced back to Monderer and Shapley (1996a,b),
who created the potential game concept on the basis of a congestion game. Their technique did
not only solve the congestion game itself but also was regarded as an equilibrium refinement
tool. Following their idea, the best-response potential games were introduced and characterised
by Voorneveld (2000). His paper proposed that, for any best-response potential game, if the
potential has a maximum over its domain, the best-response potential game has a Nash equi-
librium.
Dubey et al. (2006) were the first to embed the aggregate into potential games. By consid-
ering just a linear aggregation, they investigated a special type of best-response potential game
that restricts the best-response selection to a continuously decreasing or increasing function.
Then, any game with linear aggregation and a decreasing or increasing continuous best-response
selection is proved to belong to a pseudo-potential game, which is pre-defined in their paper. By
proving that any pseudo-potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium strategy, the existence of
a Nash equilibrium was obtained in this special class of potential games irrespective of whether
strategy sets were convex or payoff functions were quasi-concave.
In this paper, for the first time according to our knowledge, these two game-theoretic tech-
niques are successfully implemented to determine the premium strategy for modelling compe-
tition in a non-life insurance market. Thus, in greater detail, a best-response potential game
with non-linear aggregation is constructed and discussed. Premiums per unit of exposure are
regarded as the premium strategy, which makes our game to be suitable for different lines of
product-specific policies. As a new side-effect result of our approach, when it is compared
with the linear aggregation limitation in Dubey et al. (2006), we still prove the existence of a
pure Nash equilibrium strategy when the aggregate is non-linear. This is novel result from a
game-theoretic perspective. Furthermore, from the point of view of actuarial science, the pure
Nash equilibrium existence of a constructed insurance game with a non-convex strategy set is
obtained.2 That is, insurers can avoid any premium range that is not preferred to price. We
solve the insurance game with respect to two distinct insurance models by calculating the best-
response equations system. The numerical result for a 12-player insurance game is presented
under the assumption that the best-response selection premium strategies always give the global
maximum value of the corresponding payoff function.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the formation of two
insurance market competition models and constructs the game. In Section 3, the existence of a
Nash equilibrium is proved using potential game techniques. Section 4 presents the simulation
results of two models in a 12-insurer game. A conclusion can be found in Section 5.
2 Modelling Formulation and Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Notations and Assumptions
In this subsection, the necessary notation is provided and appropriate assumptions are intro-
duced. Thus, in the next lines, the definition of key parameters is concentrated for a better
understanding of the remaining paper:
1We won’t discuss unnecessary technical details about how to introduce and solve numerically the single
optimisation problem, as it is out of the scope of the present paper.
2It is true that since we are able to extend the results of Dubey et al. (2006) for a non-linear aggregation,
the concept of our model is possible to be used in other fields of economics. For this comment, we would like
cordially to thank one of our reviewers who pointed this out to us. However, further discussion falls out of the
scope of this paper, since various parameters from the relevant actuarial science literature are incorporated in
the construction of our insurance model (Taylor, 1986, 1987; Emms et al., 2007; Pantelous and Passalidou, 2013,
2015, 2016).
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N Set of insurers in the insurance market, N = {1, . . . , n}, n ∈ N;
ai Price sensitivity (positive) parameter of insurer i ∈ N ;
h1, h2 Market presence limit factor, which controls the amount of the flow of insur-
ance policies attributable to the competition in the market;
p1i Premium value (per unit of exposure) for insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1;
Pi Set of strategies for insurer i ∈ N ;
P Set of joint strategies for all insurers in the competitive market;
p Arbitrary profile in P;
p1−i Strategy profile of other players at time t = 1, {P 11 , . . . , P 1i−1, P 1i+1, . . . , P 1n};
q1i Exposure (volume of business) for insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1, which repre-
sents the number (quantity) of policies undertaken by i ∈ N ;
∆q1i Marginal difference of exposure volume for insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1;
qˆ1i Actual (number of policies) volume of exposure in the market coming to in-
surer i ∈ N at time t = 1 from the unallocated exposure at time t = 0;
qˆ0i Given number of policies in the market, which is intended to flow in or away
from insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1 from the unallocated exposure of time t = 0;
u1i Utility of insurer i at time t = 1, which represents the net income of insurer
i ∈ N at time t = 1, depends on insurer i’s premium and the aggregate of
other players’ strategies;
σi Interacting function, which represents the interaction between insurer i’s pay-
off with the others in the market;
x1−i Parameter indicating the aggregation of p
1
−i;
αi Cost ratio of holding wealth of i ∈ N , generally higher than the risk-free rate,
αi ∈ (0, 1);
pi1i Expected breakeven premium (per unit of exposure) for insurer i ∈ N at time
t = 1, i.e., expectation of future claims plus other expenses. However, for
purposes of simplicity, we skip the word ”expected” when we refer to the
breakeven premium in the remaining paper;
ki Breakeven ratio for insurer i ∈ N , ki is equal to pi1i divided by p1i ;
θ1 Market stability factor, which is used to describe the market’s condition;
βi Best-response correspondences for insurer i regarding all the other players’
strategies;
Ri Best-response correspondences for insurer i regarding x
1
−i;
rˆi The maximal selections of Ri;
Before we proceed further, the following general assumption is proposed.
Assumption 1: In the insurance market, for any insurer i ∈ N at time t = 1,
• The breakeven premium (per unit of exposure) pi1i is assumed to be less than the corre-
sponding premium p1i .
• Both pi1i and p1i are positive quantities.
Entries of new insurers and insurance products are not taken into consideration. Insurers
avoid to set premium under cost level (Taylor, 1986, 1987; Emms et al., 2007; Pantelous and
Passalidou, 2013, 2015, 2016), and see the references therein. Thus, the case that p1i ≤ pi1i is
not considered in this paper.
2.2 Insurance Premium Pricing Model
For the proposed insurance model, every insurer must maximise its wealth. In this direction, a
two-period framework: t = 0, 1 is investigated in a general insurance market. In line with the
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previous literature (see Section 1), the utility function u1i that concerns insurer i with initial
wealth u0i is formulated as follows,
u1i = −αiu0i + (1− αi)(p1i − pi1i )q1i . (2.1)
For insurer i, pi is the premium value per unit of exposure; qi represents the holding exposure
volume; pii denotes the breakeven premium per unit of exposure, which includes risk premium
and other expenses. pi, qi, pii are all positive and αi ∈ (0, 1) is a given parameter that refers
to the cost ratio of holding insurer i’s wealth. As shown in Eq. (2.1), the net income of any
insurer i is regarded as its utility u1i , and each insurer is assumed to receive the premium from
policyholders at the beginning of time t = 1. We also assume that the insurance market contains
N = {1, . . . , n} insurers, and each insurer has perfect knowledge of its previous information.
Moreover, p0i , q
0
i , pi
0
i , u
0
i are all known as constants at time t = 1. What is more, the value
of q1i implies competition in the market and must be determined analytically. An insurer’s
change in the number of policies is related to the deviation in the insurer’s premium which
is also connected to the market’s premium level (Daykin et al., 1994). With the purpose of
investigating exposure changes, marginal difference of exposure volume ∆q1i is defined in Eq.
(2.2)
∆q1i = q
1
i − q0i . (2.2)
We define the total market exposure Q1m > 0 at time t = 1 as Emms (2012) did, which
contains two components. The first part was related to the sum of the current exposure for
each insurance company, i.e., Q1 =
∑
i∈N q
1
i > 0, and the second part had to do with the
available (unallocated) exposure in the market, Qˆ1, thus
Q1m = Q
1 + Qˆ1.
Qˆ1 is allowed to be negative, and Qˆ1 ≤ Q1m. Policyholders may stop renewing policies at
the end of time t = 0, and new clients may buy policies at the beginning of time t = 1 to
become new policyholders. Consequently, Q1 cannot be equal to Q0, which causes the sum of
all insurers’ exposure change
∑
i∈N ∆q
1
i to take any value in R. In our approach, instead of
simply applying the demand function as it was the current trend (see the references in Section
1), the competition between any pair of insurers is now considered. Thus, additionally, the
interaction between insurers’ premiums needs to be formulated; consequently, ∆q1i is further
analysed.
In the following two subsections, two distinct insurance models are introduced: a) the simple
exposure difference model I (GI), where
∑
i∈N ∆q
1
i might take any value in R and the available
(unallocated) exposure of the insurance market Qˆ1 is under consideration; b) the advanced ex-
posure difference model II (GII), which is used to further analyse policies for any insurer. Both
models investigate the competition under the following assumption.
Let us define the transfer function ρ from insurer j to insurer i at time t = 1 as follows
ρ1j→i = 1−
p0j
p0i
p1i
p1j
. (2.3)
The transfer function ρ1j→i in Eq. (2.3) describes that, for time t = 1, when the quotient of
insurer i’s premium and the previous premium
p1i
p0i
is less than j’s quotient
p1j
p0j
, insurer j’s policies
tend to flow to insurer i. The exposure of insurer i increases in the competition with j, whereas
the exposure of j decreases. Policies flow in a reverse manner and
p1i
p0i
>
p1j
p0j
.
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This assumption indicates that the preference of policyholders, i.e., when one insurer in-
creases its premium and its competitor decreases its own premium, the insurer simultaneously
decreases its attractiveness. When both insurers increase their premiums by different percent-
ages, the insurer with the smaller increment becomes more attractive. Finally, in a similar
manner, when both decrease their premiums, the insurer with the larger decrement becomes
more attractive.
Insurer i gains exposure from the competition with insurer j when it offers a more attractive
premium. However, policyholders sometimes choose an insurer’s policies with higher premiums
as the most preferable one because of a better reputation (Pantelous and Passalidou, 2015) (and
the references therein). For this reason, the percentage changes in the premium are adapted
in the transfer function rather than in the value of the premium itself. Note that the transfer
function ρ1i→j can be either positive or negative. The policy amount of i is increased when
ρ1i→j > 0 and reduced when ρ
1
i→j < 0.
By investigating the flow of policies between any pair of insurers, the entire insurance market
competition can be evaluated by aggregating every competition among the different pairs of
insurers. This topic is the focus of discussion in the following subsections.
2.2.1 Simple Exposure Difference Model I (GI)
Let us consider that the competition in the insurance market is formulated as follows. First, the
premium levels vary over time, which might even cause a change in the total number of policies
in the market. Second, potential clients consider holding insurance policies when premiums
decline. In contrast, the insurance market may lose clients if the market premium level is high.
In GI , we assume that for any pair of insurers i and j, exposure qi – which is related to
gain or loss – is not equal to exposure qj – which has to do with loss or gain – respectively.
Thus, this assumption indicates that the available exposure joins or leaves the market because
of competition between i and j. The expected exposure to flow by insurer i attributable to
competition with j is given by
q1j→i = h1aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i (2.4)
6= −q1i→j , h1 > 0.
The exposure gain or loss from all other insurers to i is given by
∆q1i =
∑
j∈N
q1j→i. (2.5)
Eqs. (2.4)–(2.5) are interpreted as follows. The strength (which is related to either gain or
loss) of the exposure of insurer i attributable to the competition with j is demonstrated in Eq.
(2.4). The premium p1j is modelled as being transferred to insurer i’s premium by multiplying
p0i
p0j
in ρ1i→j for the purpose of simultaneously comparing two insurers’ premiums. Insurer i’s
market price sensitivity parameter ai is considered as information of insurer i for presenting
the market power. Note that, regarding the transferred premium
p0i
p0j
p1j as i’s previous premium
p0i , the item aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i is just the volume of business i’s gain or loss when the price elasticity is
ai. In our case, the price elasticity of demand, ai, is determined by imitating the concept of
the Lerner (1934) index, i.e., the leader in the insurance market which has the larger market
power has lower price sensitivity and so on and so forth. In a competitive market, q1i depends
not only on p1i but also on other insurers’ premiums. Hence, instead of comparing the previous
premium p0i , the transferred premium
p0i
p0j
p1j is adopted to characterise the change in the volume
of polices. In Eq. (2.4), h1 is the market presence limit factor, which is used to limit the scale
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of the policies’ flow amount. Because different stabilities exist in various insurance markets, h1
can take different positive values.
The exposure difference ∆q1i from the competition in the entire market is obtained by
summing up all of the policies’ gains or losses when competing with all insurers. Note that∑
i∈N ∆q
1
i is allowed not to be equal to zero. Regarding Eqs. (2.1)–(2.5), the utility function
can be deduced.
We define u1GI ,i (similar for u
1
GII ,i
, see Subsection 2.2.2) be the utility functions of insurer i
at time t = 1 in GI (GII).
Lemma 1. For the simple exposure difference model I, the utility function u1GI ,i of insurer i at
time t = 1 is given by
u1GI ,i = −
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
(
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)(p1i )
2
+ (1− αi)[q0i + nh1aiq0i + pi1i (
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + naih1q0i ]. (2.6)
Proof. By combining Eqs. (2.2)–(2.5), we obtain the exposure of i considering that the compe-
tition occurred at time t = 1.
q1i = q
0
i + ∆q
1
i
= q0i +
∑
j∈N
h1aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i
= q0i +
∑
j∈N
h1aiq
0
i (1−
p0j
p0i
p1i
p1j
)
= q0i + nh1aiq
0
i −
aih1q
0
i p
1
i
p0i
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
.
By taking q1i above into Eq. (2.1), we have that
u1GI ,i = −αiu0i + (1− αi)(p1i − pi1i )(q0i + nh1aiq0i
−aih1q
0
i p
1
i
p0i
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)
= −aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
(
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)(p1i )
2
+ (1− αi)[q0i + nh1aiq0i + pi1i (
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
)
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + naih1q0i ].
2.2.2 Advanced Exposure Difference Model II (GII)
The modified exposure for insurer i can be further analysed. Different from GI , in GII , we
concretely characterize the two components mentioned in Subsection 2.2, i.e., a) reallocated
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policies of the previous market Q0, and b) policies from the (unallocated) exposure Qˆ1.
Regarding the competition between any pair of insurers i and j, the number of exchange
policies is characterised. The exposure gain or loss from i to j is obtained with respect to both
insurers’ premium strategy and market power. Given a positive market presence limit factor
h2, the strength of the flow of business between i and j is modelled as follows
q1j→i = h2(aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i − ajρ1i→jq0j ) (2.7)
= −q1i→j , h2 > 0.
As demonstrated in Eq. (2.7), both exposure i which tended to a gain or loss, aiρ
1
j→iq
0
i , and
exposure j which showed a potential loss or gain, −ajρ1i→jq0j , represent the exchange strength
from summing up the volume. The volume of the flow of exposure is further governed by a
positive market presence limit factor h2. Note that
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N q
1
j→i equals to zero because of
policies exchange between insurers in the component a). In the same way, for the b) component,
the potential flow of policies, either attract or withdraw from the unallocated insurance market
Qˆ1, and it is modelled as h2ai(1− p
1
i
p0i
θ1)q0i .
The flow of policies from the unallocated insurance market is modelled similarly to the con-
cept of price elasticity: a comparison with previous premium price. Apart from the competition
between pairs of insurers, they tend to lose policies to the available market when increasing
their premiums and gain policies by lowering them. In addition, a positive market stability
factor θ1 is adopted to describe the market condition: θ1 = 1 indicates that the market faces a
general condition; the insurance industry expands when θ1 < 1 because more policies tend to
flow into the industry from the unallocated market; θ1 > 1, when the market faces a situation
with challenges. Overall, the exposure gain or loss for i is given by
∆q1i =
∑
j∈N
q1j→i + h2ai(1−
p1i
p0i
θ1)q0i , θ
1 > 0. (2.8)
Following Assumption 1, ki ∈ (0, 1). Then, the objective function for the GII case can be
deduced.
Lemma 2. For the advanced exposure difference model II, the utility function u1GII ,i of insurer
i at time t = 1 is given by
u1GII ,i = −
(1− ki)(1− αi)h2aiq0i
p0i
(
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
+ θ1)(p1i )
2
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + (n+ 1)h2aiq0i − h2
∑
j∈N
ajq
0
j )p
1
i
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)h2p0i
∑
j∈N
ajq
0
j
p1j
p0j
− αiu0i . (2.9)
Proof. Using Eqs. (2.7)–(2.8) instead, Lemma 2 can be showed similarly as Lemma 1.
In the next Subsection, the construction of the game is presented and further discussed.
2.3 Game Construction
2.3.1 Normal Form Game
Let us define an N -insurer game, G, in a two-period framework: t = 0, 1. Each insurer i’s
strategy at time t = 1 is p1i , which stands for the action setting premium as the value of p
1
i ,
whereas Pi is the set of strategies. We use P˜
1
i to denote the equilibrium strategy for insurer i.
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Insurer i’s payoff function is defined as u1i : P → R, where P ≡ P1 × · · · × PN and p is an
arbitrary profile in P. The notation p1−i ∈ P−i stands for {p11, . . . , p1i−1, p1i+1, . . . , p1n}, which
is used to represent the strategy profile of other players at time t. (p1i , p
1
−i) ∈ P decomposes
a strategy profile in two parts, the insurer i’s strategy and other insurers’ components. Given
this game in the insurance market, instead of calculating the optimal premium that maximises
a single insurer’s wealth, as was the case in the previous literature (see Section 1 for further
details), the calculation of the Nash equilibrium is targeted.
Generally, from a game theory perspective, the Nash equilibrium is a prediction strategy
that dictates the choices that each insurer is willing to make. Given the optimal strategy profile
of other insurers, the market reaches a Nash equilibrium when no insurer can increase its total
payoff by changing its strategy. The Nash equilibrium is defined through the best-response
correspondences. In what it follows the next definitions should be stated.
Definition 1. (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) Define βi by
βi(p
1
−i) = {p1i ∈ Pi : u1i (p1i , p1−i) ≥ u1i (p´1i , p1−i),∀p´1i ∈ Pi}.
We call βi the best-response correspondences for insurer i.
For any choice p−i ∈ P−i of others’ strategies at time t, the set βi(p1−i) of best replies of
insurer i is given by
βi(p
1
−i) = arg max
p1i∈Pi
u1i (p
1
i , p
1
−i).
Each player’s predicted strategy must be a best response to the predicted strategies of the
other players as the market reaches a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2. (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) A strategy profile, p˜1, is a Nash equilibrium of the
game (at time t) if and only if each player’s strategy is a best response to the other players’
strategies. That is
p˜1i ∈ β(p˜1−i), ∀i ∈ N.
The best-response potential game technique is further considered, which is widely used to
prove the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3. (Voorneveld, 2000) A strategic game G˜ =< (βi,Pi)i∈N > is a best-response
potential game if there exists a function f :P → R such that
∀i ∈ N, ∀p−i ∈P−i : βi(p−i) = argmax
pi∈Pi
f(pi, p−i).
The function f is called a best-response potential function of the game G˜.
The potential function f offers a new approach to determining the Nash equilibrium for the
game G˜ by maximising f . Note that, f is a function, which depends on every insurer’s strategy.
If f has a maximum over P, G˜ has a Nash equilibrium. A specific type of game, known as an
aggregate game, is introduced to solve the Nash equilibrium for the N insurers’ game.
2.3.2 Aggregate Games
With the additional requirement that each insurer’s payoff is written as a function that depends
only on its own strategy and an aggregate of the full strategy profile, a normal form game can
be transformed into a game with aggregation. Formally, we have the following definition.
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Definition 4. (Martimort and Stole, 2012) An aggregate game in the insurance market, G′ =<
(Pi, u
1
i )i∈N , g >, is a normal form game with an extra condition that there exists an aggre-
gate function, g(p1) : P −→ M ⊆ R, such that each player’s payoff function can be further
specialised to the aggregate form
p1 7→ u1i (p1i , g(p1)),
where M1 ∈M, is called an aggregator of p1.
The only requirement for a game to represent an aggregate game is that there exists an
aggregate function (Alos-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). To construct an insurance game with ag-
gregation, a meaningful monotone aggregate function g is expected to be obtained. Here, the
Insurance Game I, equipped with the objective function in the simple exposure difference model
I, and the Insurance Game II, implemented with the objective function in the advanced expo-
sure difference model II, are considered. Before we proceed further, the definitions of GI and
GII are given as follows.
Definition 5. A game GI =< (PGI ,i, u
1
GI ,i
)i∈N > has a finite set of players N , with compact,
positive, pure strategy set PGI ,i with respect to every i, whereas u
1
GI ,i
in Eq. (2.6) is the payoff
function for i at time t = 1. This type of game is called Insurance Game I.
Similarly, Insurance Game II is defined as GII =< (PGII ,i, u
1
GII ,i
)i∈N >, with player set N ,
compact, positive, pure strategy set PGII ,i and payoff function u
1
GII ,i
in Eq. (2.9).
3 Main Results
In this section, the theoretical results for models GI and GII are presented. However, before
we proceed further with the existence of a Nash equilibrium, it is necessary to show that both
GI and GII are aggregate games.
Lemma 3. Based on the definition of payoff functions stated in the previous section, both GI
and GII are aggregate games.
Proof. Denote M1 =
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
as the aggregation of GI game. Then, the payoff function in Eq.
(2.6) turns out to be
u1GI ,i = −
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
M1(p1i )
2 + (1− αi)[q0i + nh1aiq0i + pi1iM1
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + naih1q0i ].
There exists an aggregate function g(p1) =
∑
j∈N
p0j
p1j
in GI . For GII game, we further denote
m1 =
∑
j∈N ajq
0
j
p1j
p0j
as the other aggregation. Similarly, we obtain the payoff,
u1GII ,i = −
(1− ki)(1− αi)h2aiq0i
p0i
(M1 + θ1)(p1i )
2
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + (n+ 1)h2aiq0i − h2
∑
j∈N
ajq
0
j )p
1
i
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)h2p0im1 − αiu0i .
Thus, the statement of the Lemma is derived.
In aggregate games, for every player i, the other players in the competitive market are
considered as a single player because their strategies aggregate through an interacting function
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σi :P−i → X−i ⊆ R. Intuitively, the other players influence i through the interaction function
σi(p
1
−i). X−i = σi(P−i) is set to indicate the range of σi, whereas x
1
−i = σi(p
1
−i) ∈ X−i for any
t. With x1−i =
∑
j 6=i
p0j
p1j
, respectively, the GI and GII payoff functions are given as follows:
u1GI ,i = −
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
x1−i(p
1
i )
2
+ (1− αi)[q0i + (n− 1)h1aiq0i + pi1i x1−i
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]p1i
− αiu0i − pi1i (1− αi)[q0i + (n− 1)aih1q0i ]
and
u1GII ,i = −
(1− ki)(1− αi)h2aiq0i
p0i
(x1−i + θ
1)(p1i )
2
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + nh2aiq0i − h2
∑
j 6=i
ajq
0
j )p
1
i
+ (1− ki)(1− αi)h2p0i
∑
j 6=i
ajq
0
j
p1j
p0j
− αiu0i .
To generate Nash equilibrium premium strategies, Ri : X−i → 2Pi , we need to define
Ri(x
1
−i) = argmax
p1i∈P
u1i (p
1
i , x
1
−i),
which coincides with βi(p
1
−i). In other words, Ri describes how the interaction parameter
x1−i = σi(p
1
−i) influences insurer i’s best-response strategy.
In the case of GI , we have
RGI ,i(x
1
−i) = argmax
p1i∈P
u1GI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i). (3.1)
rˆGI ,i is defined as the maximal selections of RGI ,i(x
1
−i), and for GII , we have
RGII ,i(x
1
−i) = argmax
p1i∈P
u1GII ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i). (3.2)
rˆGII ,i is defined as the maximal selections of RGII ,i(x
1
−i).
Before we prove that both GI and GII are best-response potential games, we need to recall
first, Lemma 4 which is proposed by Jensen (2010).
Lemma 4. The game < (βi,Pi)i∈N > is a best-response potential game if and only if there
exists a real-valued function, f :→ R, such that:
p˜1  p1 ⇒ f(p˜1) ≥ f(p1) (3.3)
and
p˜1  p1 ⇒ f(p˜1) > f(p1), (3.4)
where the previous two binary relations are defined as:
p˜1  p1 ⇔ ∃i ∈ N, s.t. [p˜1−i = p1−i, and p˜1i ∈ Ri(x1−i)]
p˜1  p1 ⇔ [p˜1  p1, and p1−i /∈ Ri(x1−i)]
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The next lemma is useful for the main result of our paper. Its proof is rather technical, and
for better understanding, we present it using intermediate steps.
Lemma 5. Both GI and GII are best-response potential games.
Proof. Initially, GI is considered.
• Step 1: State the best-response potential function.
– Convex hull of X−i.
In the case that Pi is not convex, X−i is not convex as well. Denote Σ−i as the
convex hull of X−i, which is obviously compact.
For GI , RGI ,i is the best-response correspondences to x
1
−i of i. We extend RGI ,i
in a piecewise linear fashion to ΦGI ,i, defined on the domain Σ−i. ΦGI ,i coincides
with RGI ,i on X−i. For any s ∈ Σ−i \X−i define
ΦGI ,i(s) =
z − s
z − yRGI ,i(y) +
s− y
z − yRGI ,i(z),
with y = max{v ∈ X−i|v ≤ s} and z = min{v ∈ X−i|v ≥ s}.
– For any insurer i, linearly enhance the best response domain to be the
same as its strategy domain.
Let PˆGI ,i denote the range of player i’s best response map, and the set be {p1i ∈
PGI ,i : p
1
i ∈ Ri(σi(p1−i))} ⊆ PGI ,i. Denote φ1GI ,i as the selections of ΦGI ,i, which is
continuous on Σ−i. We further define a mapping Oi(φ1GI ,i), which linearly enhances
the domain PˆGI ,i to PGI ,i. In addition, r
1
GI ,i
is defined as the selection of Oi(φ
1
GI ,i
).
In other words,
∀i,∃xˆ1−i s.t. p1i ∈ Oi(ΦGI ,i(xˆ1−i)).
Let ⊥1i = minp1−i∈P1−i σi(p1−i), >1i = maxp1−i∈P1−i σi(p1−i), and extend each r1GI ,i to
[⊥1i ,>1i ] along the line with Kukushkin (2004).
– We state that the following Eq. (3.5) is the best-response potential func-
tion of GI .
f(p1i , p
1
−i) =
∑
i
[
p0i
∫ >1i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ − p
0
i
p1i
⊥i
]
+
∑
i<j
p0i p
0
j
p1i p
1
j
. (3.5)
• Step 2: Prove that Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) are true.
– Prove that each of the correspondences RGI ,i : X−i → 2Pi is a strictly
decreasing selection; that is, for every Ri, all x
1
−i ∈ X−i such that Ri(x¯1−i) >
Ri(x
1
−i) whenever x¯
1
−i ≤ x1−i.
The statement is satisfied as long as the conditions of Topkis’ Theorem (see Topkis
(1998) for details) are satisfied, i.e. each Pi is a lattice, every uGI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i) super-
modular in p1i ,and has strictly decreasing differences in p
1
i and x
1
−i.
Since p1i is one-dimensional for all i, the first two of these requirements are satisfied:
Pi is a lattice for all i; every uGI ,i supermodular in p
1
i . In addition, because u
1
i is
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twice differentiable, uGI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i) has strictly decreasing differences in p
1
i and x
1
−i if
and only if ∂2uGI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i)/∂p
1
i ∂x
1
−i < 0. In an insurance game GI , we have
∂2uGI ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i)/∂x
1
−i∂p
1
i = ∂{−2
(1− αi)h1aiq0i
p0i
x1−ip
1
i + (1− αi)[q0i
+ (n− 1)h1aiq0i + pi1i x1−i
aih1q
0
i
p0i
]}/∂x1−i
=
aih1q
0
i (1− αi)
p0i
(pi1i − 2p1i ) < 0.
According to the assumption that for any i, t, pi1i < p
1
i , the above item is negative.
Hence, u1i (p
1
i , x
1
−i) has strictly decreasing differences in p
1
i and x
1
−i. Because Oi(φ
1
GI ,i
)
enhance the domain PˆGI ,i linearly, r
1
GI ,i
coincides with φ1GI ,i. One can deduce that
if xˆ1−i > x
1
−i, we have p
1
i < p˜
1
i and vice versa.
– The comparison between f(p˜1i , p
1
−i) and f(p
1
i , p
1
−i).
With equilibrium premium p˜1i of i in p˜
1, the difference between f(p˜1) and f(p1) is
demonstrated as
f(p˜1i , p
1
−i)− f(p1i , p1−i)
=
∑
i∈N
[∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
]
−
∑
i∈N
[∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
]
−
∑
i∈N
[
p0i
p˜1i
· ⊥1i
]
+
∑
i∈N
[
p0i
p1i
· ⊥1i
]
+
[
p0i
p˜1i
− p
0
i
p1i
]
·
∑
j 6=i
p0j
p1j
=
∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
⊥1i
p0i ·min{−
1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−p
0
i
p˜1i
· ⊥1i +
p0i
p1i
· ⊥1i +
p0i
p˜1i
· x1−i −
p0i
p1i
· x1−i
= p0i
[∫ >1i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
]
.
When xˆ1−i > x
1
−i,
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f(P˜ 1i , p
1
−i)− f(p1i , p1−i)
=
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ +
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
+
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ +
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
[
1
p1i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
]dτ > 0.
When xˆ1−i < x
1
−i,
f(P˜ 1i , p
1
−i)− f(p1i , p1−i)
=
∫ xˆ1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ +
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
+
∫ >1i
x1−i
min{− 1
p˜1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ xˆ1−i
⊥1i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ −
∫ >1i
x1−i
min{− 1
p1i
,− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
}dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ xˆ1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ +
∫ >1i
x1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ xˆ1−i
x1−i
− 1
p1i
dτ −
∫ >1i
xˆ1−i
− 1
r1GI ,i(τ)
dτ
−
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p˜1i
dτ +
∫ x1−i
⊥1i
− 1
p1i
dτ
=
∫ x1−i
xˆ1−i
[
1
r1GI ,i(τ)
− 1
p1i
]dτ > 0.
It is obvious that if xˆ1−i = x
1
−i, this item equals zero. In this case, p
1
i , p˜
1
i ∈ RGI ,i(σi(p1−i))
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(i.e. if Eq. (3.3) holds but not Eq. (3.4)), f(P˜ 1i , p
1
−i) − f(p1i , p1−i) = 0. Eq. (3.3) is
proved to be true in an insurance game GI . If not, Eq. (3.4) is proved.
• Step 3: Conclusion
We conclude that when (p1i , p
1
−i), (p˜
1
i , p
1
−i) ∈ Pi,(p˜1i , p1−i)  ()(p1i , p1−i) ⇒ f(p˜1i , p1−i) −
f(p1i , p
1
−i) ≥ (>)0, with respect to Lemma 5. An insurance game G1 is the best-response
potential game, whereas f is the best-response potential function.
Similarly, in GII ,
∂2u1GII ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i)/∂x
1
−i∂p
1
i = ∂{−2
(1− αi)(1− ki)h2aiq0i
p0i
(x1−i + θ
1)p1i
+(1− ki)(1− αi)(q0i + nh2aiq0i − h2
∑
j 6=i
ajq
0
j )}/∂x1−i
= −2(1− αi)(1− ki)h2aiq
0
i
p0i
p1i < 0.
We also obtain that u1GII ,i(p
1
i , x
1
−i) has strictly decreasing differences in p
1
i and x
1
−i. By
replacing r1GI ,i by r
1
GII ,i
in f from Eq. (3.5), one obtains the best-response potential function
of u1GII ,i in GII .
Following the discussion so far, one can deduce the useful Theorem, which is the main
theoretical result of our paper.
Theorem 1. The Nash equilibrium at time t = 1 in both GI and GII exists.
Proof. In GI , let us suppose that
p˜1 ∈ argmax f(p1i , p1−i).
Such a p˜1 exists because Pi is compact for any i and f is continuous. If p˜
1 is not a Nash
equilibrium of G1, then f(c
1
i , p˜
1
−i) > f(p˜
1) for some c1i ∈ Pi, contradicting that p˜1 maximises f .
Hence, the Nash equilibrium exists in GI . Similarly, it can be shown that the Nash equilibrium
exists in GII .
4 Numerical Example
In this section, a numerical example with 12 major non-life insurance companies based on
the number of contracts (i.e., volume of business) they have in their portfolios is proposed to
illustrate the main modelling characteristics and theoretical findings of our paper. A scenario
which investigates insurers with different market power is considered by consisting of a market
leading insurer with 796, 139 contracts, nine almost equal insurers with around 300, 000 contracts
and two followers with only around 200, 000 contracts.3 Referring to the premium values at
time t = 0, the pricing strategy for the entire market of insurers is derived by finding the
Nash equilibrium premiums at time t = 1. The impact of different parameters involved in the
process to the equilibrium premiums is also analysed. To generate results that are comparable
to those existing in the literature of actuarial science and for simplicity in our calculations,
convex premium strategy sets are considered in the numerical example.4
3We don’t have here any intention to develop any type of Stackelberg leadership model. However, the Greek
insurance market might be considered as an ideal case for this model. Thus, it will be considered as a future
work.
4We recall that the theoretical results did not assume any type of convexity.
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Insurance Companies Premium Number of Contracts Price sensitivity
parameter
i p0i q
0
i ai
1 e269.09 298,269 2.0
2 e282.07 303,673 2.0
3 e377.06 282,224 2.0
4 e371.52 304,609 2.0
5 e281.56 295,769 2.0
6 e377.83 796,139 1.9
7 e257.88 298,304 2.0
8 e366.99 200,135 2.1
9 e347.58 211,314 2.1
10 e351.18 299,690 2.0
11 e364.11 299,995 2.0
12 e291.22 319,453 2.0
Table 1: 12 insurance companies are considered from the Greek insurance market in 2010.
Premium values and number of contracts are based on data from the Hellenic Association of
Insurance Companies. Price sensitivity parameter for every insurer demonstrated in the table
is used as a benchmark.
Data is used from the Greek market, as it was presented in (Pantelous and Passalidou, 2013,
2016). Thus, the premium prices are calculated in Euros. Let us assume that the number of
contracts at time t = 0 is demonstrated in Table 1. With respect to t, this dataset is adopted for
a 12-player game because the insurers’ premium prices and exposure in the previous period are
used. With an intention to describe insurance companies’ market power, the price sensitivity
parameter, ai, for all insurers i is characterised further.
The standard values of price sensitivity parameter are set up in Table 1, and they can be
used as a benchmark. As it was already demonstrated, insurer 6 is considered to be the market
leader with a lower price sensitivity parameter a6 = 1.9, because it occupies significant greater
market weight compared with other insurers. Correspondingly, insurers 8 and 9 are regarded as
market followers, which have price sensitivity parameters of value 2.1. All of the others insurers’
price sensitivity parameter take the value of 2.0 in our insurance game.5
The diversity of the price sensitivity parameter for the insurers obviously affect the equilib-
rium premium profiles. Different values of ai are investigated through a simulation. However,
for any i, a1i are restricted in [1.5, 2.5]. Using the previously demonstrated market data, the
Nash equilibrium premium profiles are calculated for both GI and GII .
4.1 Insurance Game I Simulation Results
In Insurance Game I, GI , the Nash equilibrium premium profiles are calculated with respect to
the market’s data at time t = 0; see Table 1. Table 2 sets up also ad hoc the main parameters.
Note that for any insurer i in G1, the breakeven premium pi
1
i is not assumed to be proportional
to p1i . The percentage between pi
1
i and p
1
i is used to describe the cost structure of i.
From Eq. (2.6), the second order condition of payoff is negative for each insurer i in GI .
Hence, when the stationary point is in the domain PGI ,i, i’s payoff is maximized. What is more,
one can find out the Nash equilibrium profiles by implementing the following algorithm:
5The values for ai have been considered ad hoc based on the concept of Lerner (1934) index. Unfortunately,
we don’t have access to more detailed data, and some of the model parameters are rather artificial. This is
common in the corresponding literature (Emms et al., 2007; Emms and Haberman, 2009)
17
Number of market participants n 12
Market presence limit factor h1 0.09
The breakeven ratio of every insurer ki 0.5
Table 2: Environmental parameter values in GI
Step 1: For each insurer i, set the first order condition of its payoff function equal to zero as
the maximum selection(s). From Eq. (3.1),
rˆGI ,i :
1 + (n− 1)h1ai + pi1i x1−i aih1p0i
2h1aix1−i
p0i = 0.
Step 2: Solve the system of r1GI ,i.
Step 3: Select the profile(s) corresponds (correspond) to each insurer’s premium located in
PGI ,i, which is (are) the Nash equilibrium premium profile(s).
Be aware that when the derived values are located outside of PGI ,i, then these are not the
equilibrium premiums, as the edges of the premium domain reach a maximum instead. Fur-
thermore, it indicates that the Nash equilibrium still exists even though the calculated premium
profile have not located inside of PGI ,i. However, this case won’t be analysed further here.
Let us now characterize the premium strategies set PGI ,i. For each insurer i, the premiums
are restricted to take values between e180 and e800 during any period, i.e., p1i ∈ [e180,e800].
In addition the other parameters are restrained, i.e., the market presence limit factor h1 ∈
[0.07, 0.11] and the breakeven premium pi1i ∈ [30%p1i , 70%p1i ], for any i, t. Numerical results for
the system of equations r1GI ,i are generated using m-file ”fsolve”. It should be mentioned that
the Nash equilibrium premium profile might not be unique. However, among these results we
chose the first positive premium profile which located in PGI ,i.
6 This result is illustrated in
Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the corresponding number of contracts from insurers 1 to 12.
The ratio between insurers’ equilibrium premiums at time t = 1 is correlative to the previous
premium ratio in Figure 1. Note that the market leader insurer 6 tends to increase its premium,
which leads to a reduction of its policy numbers in Figure 2. Larger market power offers insurer
6 the advantage in competition, which allows it to increase its premium until equilibrium for
seeking higher profit.
Figure 3 demonstrates the effect of the increasing parameter pi16 in GI . In Figure 3, adjust-
ment for a single insurer’s breakeven premium ratio is investigated. The market leader, insurer
6, is modelled to increase pi16 from 30% to 70% of p
1
i , whereas all other insurers keep the ratio
at 50%. The increase in the breakeven premium ratio of insurer 6 is observed to cause not only
an increase in its equilibrium premium but also a slight incremental increase in other insurers’
premiums.
Price sensitivity parameter, ai, strongly affects the equilibrium premium of each insurer i.
The effects of modifying ai with regard to the market leading insurer 6 and the market follower
8 are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, and all other parameters remain the same as before. Figure
4 shows that the two players’ equilibrium premiums decrease as the price sensitivity parameter
decreases. In Figure 5, the number of contracts is observed to increase as ai increases for both
insurers 6 and 8. In addition, in both Figures 4 and 5, the slope of insurer 6 is obviously larger
than that of insurer 8, indicating that parameter ai is more sensitive with respect to the market
leader than the market follower.
The values of parameters a6 and h1 strongly affect the equilibrium premium at time t = 1.
We give an example of insurer 6 about the sensitivity with respect to these two parameters in
Figure 6.
6Among all the possible positive profiles, we pick up the smallest one based on the iterative algorithm of the
Matlab, m-file ”fsolve”.
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Figure 1: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) premium profiles in GI . The
red solid line is the equilibrium premium profile at time t = 1 with respect to 12 insurers, which
is on the x-axis. Premium values are given on the y-axis. The blue dash line represents the
previous premium profile given in the Table 1.
Figure 2: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) number of policies in GI .
The left figure illustrates the number of contracts with respect to 12 insurers at time t = 0,
which are given in Table 1. The right figure shows the equilibrium number of contracts at time
t = 1.
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Figure 3: Diversity of equilibrium premium profiles with different pi16 in GI . The market leader
6’s breakeven premium ratio is investigated, which takes values from 30% to 70%. The corre-
sponding 5 different equilibrium premium profiles are given.
Figure 4: Equilibrium premium sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GI .
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Figure 5: Equilibrium number of policies sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GI .
Figure 6: Diversity of insurer 6’s equilibrium premium in GI . Different equilibrium premium
values are given, with respect to different a6 and h1.
4.2 Insurance Game II Simulation Results
Using Table 1, and the same parameters reported in Table 3, the Nash equilibrium premium
profiles in GII are calculated. From Eq. (2.9), the second order condition of payoff is negative
for each insurer i in GII . Similarly, we use the algorithm which is presented for the case GI by
assuming that rˆ1GII ,i is defined by
rˆ1GII ,i :
q0i + nh2aiq
0
i − h2
∑
j 6=i ajq
0
j
2h2aiq0i (x
1
−i + θ1)
p0i = 0,
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where rˆ1GII ,i is the maximal selection of RGII ,i(x
1
−i), see Eq. (3.2), for i at time t = 1 in GII .
Note that the breakeven ratio ki does not affect the best-reply selection in GII . If the
calculated premium for each insurer is located in PGI ,i, the Nash equilibrium is unique in GII ,
since the equation of rˆ1GII ,i is a linear one.
Number of market participants n 12
Market presence limit factor h2 0.0205
Market stability factor θ1 1
Table 3: Environmental parameter values in GII
In GII , for each insurer i, the premiums are retained between e180 and e900 during any
period, i.e., p1i ∈ [e150,e900]. The other parameters are also restricted, such as the market
presence limit factor h2 ∈ [0.0203, 0.0207] and the market stability factor θ1 ∈ [0.8, 1.2] for any
t. Figures 7 and 8, respectively, show the equilibrium premium profile and number of contracts
from insurers 1 to 12.
In Figure 7, similar to GI , market leader insurer 6 tends to increase its premium until
equilibrium. As exposure flows between insurers are enhanced, the ratio between insurers’
equilibrium premium in GII significantly diverge from the previous. Compared with GI , the
market leader has a greater advantage in the competition, which generates a larger reduction
in the policy numbers than in Figure 2. Market followers 8 and 9 reduce their premiums
significantly to increase their exposure. As demonstrated in Figure 8, the equilibrium number
of policies of insurers 8 and 9 approximately reach the other insurer’s level, excluding the market
leader insurer 6.
With the other parameters unaffected, the impacts of modifying ai in G2 with regard to the
market leading insurer 6 and the market follower 8 are illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. Similarly
as GI , Figures 9 and 10 indicate that both players’ equilibrium premiums in GII decrease and
the number of contracts increases as the price sensitivity parameter ai decreases. In addition,
we also conclude that the parameter ai with respect to the market leader is more sensitive than
the market follower in GII . Comparing with Figures 4 and 5 in GI that a6 is more sensitive
than a8 in GII is also noteworthy.
A new parameter, market stability factor θ1, significantly affect the equilibrium premium
profile in GII . Figure 11 illustrates the diversity of the equilibrium premium profiles with a
varying market stability factor θ1 from 0.8 to 1.2. As θ1 represents the whole market’s business
condition, it is reasonable to expect the equilibrium profile entirely moves up or down with
different θ1.
Similarly as in GI , we test the sensitivity of a6 and h2 for GII in Figure 12. As we can
observe, h2 is much more sensitive than h1, an tiny increase of just 10
−4 in h2 causes a compelling
decrease in equilibrium premium for insurer 6.
Overall, we observe that insurers with larger market power take advantage in the competi-
tion, and they tend to increase their premium to reach equilibrium. On the other hand, insurers
with less market power tend to decrease their premium requesting a bigger volume of exposure.
The price sensitivity parameter, ai, is quite sensitive. The market presence limit factor h1, h2,
and the market stability factor θ1 have an impact on the market equilibrium levels, which con-
trol the exposure of volume flow among the insurers and the exposures volume flow into or away
from the insurance market, respectively. Different with GI , a breakeven premium for i appears
not to affect the insurer’s equilibrium premium in GII .
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Figure 7: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) premium profiles in GII .
Similar with Figure 1.
Figure 8: Previous (at time t = 0) vs. equilibrium (at time t = 1) number of policies in GII .
Similar with Figure 2.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium premium sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GII .
Figure 10: Equilibrium number of policies sensitivity test of a6 and a8 in GII .
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Figure 11: Diversity of equilibrium premium profiles with different θ1 in GII . The market
stability factor θ1 is investigated which takes values from 0.8 to 1.2. The corresponding 5
different equilibrium premium profiles are given.
Figure 12: Diversity of insurer 6’s equilibrium premium in GII . Different equilibrium premium
values are given, with respect to different a6 and h2.
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5 Conclusion
This paper models two-stage non-cooperative games in an insurance market to investigate how
the competition impacts the pricing process of non-life insurance products. Insurers compete to
maximise their payoffs in a second stage by adjusting premium pricing strategies, which leads to
diversity of the volume of exposure. We further characterise one insurer’s second-stage modified
volume of exposure in a way that sums up the exposure flows in or out during competitions
with other insurers. The modified second volumes of exposure in any two insurers’ competition
are characterised by transferring one insurer’s second stage premium to the other’s first-stage
premium and modelling the changing volume through a definition of price elasticity. Two models
are discussed in detail regarding the modified volume of exposure: simple exposure difference
model I (GI) and advanced exposure difference model II (GII). Using payoffs in these two
models, two N-player games are constructed with non-linear aggregate and positive, compact
but not necessarily convex, premium strategy sets. A potential game with an aggregation
technique is applied: we prove the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium of these two games
by determining the potential functions. Both games’ pure Nash equilibriums can be solved by
calculating the best-response equation systems. The numerical results for 12-player insurance
games are presented under the framework that the best-response selection premium strategies
always provide the global maximum value of the corresponding payoff function.
The insurance game can be extended in different directions. A natural next extension is
to develop dynamic insurance games to observe insurance market premium pricing cycles. Ap-
plying stochastic models might be interesting in dynamic cases. Another extension would be a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, where insurers choose a probability distribution over possible
premium strategies.
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